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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW-UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
-APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES BETWEEN AN EMPLOYER AND A
UNION IN A HYBRID SECTION 301 SuIT-The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that a union may be liable to a discharged
employee for a portion of his lost wages when the union breaches
its duty of fair representation.
Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
On February 21, 1976, the petitioner, Charles V. Bowen, an em-
ployee of the United States Postal Service (Service) was indefi-
nitely suspended pending an investigation of an alleged assault on
another employee.' The Postmaster notified Bowen of his termina-
tion on March 30, 1976.' Bowen then filed a grievance with the
local of the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO (Union),
which was his representative for collective bargaining purposes.3
The grievance was processed through the grievance procedure to
the Union's national office where a determination was made not to
pursue the complaint.
4
Bowen then sued both the Service and the Union in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.3 The
1. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 590 (1983). The employee testi-
fied at trial that he did not report the incident because he considered it insignificant. Brief
for Petitioner at 5, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
3. Id.
4. 103 S. Ct. at 591. According to the petitioner, the apparently meritorious grievance
was recommended for arbitration by the Union official who submitted it to the national
office. An official at the national level, who was reviewing a backlog of cases after returning
from a two week Union meeting in Las Vegas, disregarded the recommendation for arbitra-
tion made in the lower steps of the procedure. After reviewing Bowen's file for approxi-
mately fifteen minutes, the official decided to drop Bowen's complaint. Brief for Petitioner
at 6, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).5. 103 S. Ct. at 591. Bowen alleged that the Service had breached the collective bar-
gaining agreement by discharging him unjustly and that the Union had breached its duty of




jury, sitting as an advisory panel,6 returned special verdicts against
both defendants.7 The district court, in accordance with the jury's
findings, apportioned the compensatory damages between the Ser-
vice and the Union.' The court ordered the Service to pay
$22,954.12 and the Union $30,000.00, the sum of which represented
Bowen's lost benefits and wages from February 21, 1976.1 The
court set aside the jury's award of punitive damages against both
defendants, indicating that it would be unfair to assess such dam-
ages against the Union while the Service's claim of sovereign im-
munity would preclude its liability.10
On appeal by both defendants, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit"' accepted the district court's findings of fact but
held, as a matter of law, that the Union could not be held liable for
Bowen's lost wages. 1" Additionally, the court of appeals refused to
increase the judgment against the Service to reflect its order vacat-
ing the assessment of damages against the Union. 3 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari14 and reversed the decision of the court of
appeals.
6. 103 S. Ct. at 591. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976). "Any action against the United
States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury. . ." Id.
7. 103 S. Ct. at 591. One question of the special verdict asked the jury to determine
the compensatory damages to which Bowen would be entitled should the jury find that the
Union breached its duty of fair representation and/or that the Service discharged Bowen
unjustly. A subsequent question asked the jury to apportion the compensatory damages be-
tween the Union and the Service. Despite the Union's objection to any type of question
which would permit the jury to find the Union liable for back wages, the district court
suggested to the jury that the hypothetical arbitration date, August, 1977, could be used as a
basis for the apportionment of damages. Id. at 591 & nn.2-3.
8. Id. at 591-92. The district court held that the Service had discharged Bowen with,
out cause and that the Union handled Bowen's complaint in an arbitrary fashion. Addition-
ally the court noted that Bowen could not have pursued his complaint without the Union
and that had Bowen's complaint been arbitrated, he would have been reinstated. Id. See 470
F. Supp. at 1130-31.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 592. The district court noted that the case presented a problem of
apportionment, not one of liability. Id. See 470 F. Supp. at 1131.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 590 n.4.
11. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 588 (1983).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 592. The court of appeals, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967),
stated, without explanation, that the Service was exclusively liable for lost wages. 642 F.2d
at 82.
13. 103 S. Ct. at 592. The court of appeals, in a footnote added after the opinion was
filed, said that Bowen's failure to file an appeal on the judgment against the Service pre-
cluded a revision of the judgment against the Service. 103 S. Ct. at 592 n.7. See 642 F.2d at
82 n.6.
14. 103 S. Ct. at 588.
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority,"5 first reviewed the
Court's holding in Vaca v. Sipes." He stated that Vaca permits an
employee to recover damages from both the employer and the
union where the employer breaches the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the union breaches its duty of fair representation.17 As to
apportionment of these damages, Justice Powell indicated that
Vaca does not permit the employer to be assessed for increased
damages caused by the union's failure to fairly represent the em-
ployee." He admitted that the lower courts have applied Vaca's
governing principle inconsistently, but he disagreed with the dis-
senting Justices' assertion that the courts of appeals have unani-
mously rejected the majority's method of apportionment.1 9
Justice Powell then considered the Union's interpretation of
Vaca.20 The Union contended that where a union breaches its duty
of fair representation, Vaca merely permits the employee to sue
the employer on the contract.21 Justice Powell stated that the
Union's argument attempted to equate a collective bargaining
agreement with that of common law employment which is termina-
ble at will. 2' He distinguished the two and noted that a collective
15. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stevens and O'Connor joined in the
majority opinion.
16. 103 S. Ct. at 593. See 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
17. 103 S. Ct. at 593. Justice Powell quoted the following language from Vaca:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the employer and the
union according to the damage caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributa-
ble solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the union,
but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the
grievance should not be charged to the employer.
Id. (quoting 386 U.S. at 197-98).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 593.
19. Id. at 593 & n.8. Justice Powell indicated that only one case cited by the dissent
failed to apportion damages after fully considering the issue. Id. n.8. See Seymour v. Olin
Corp., 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982). He noted that other appellate decisions which rejected
apportionment had minimally considered the issue. 103 S. Ct. at 593 n.8. See Milstead v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896
(1982) and Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 588 (1983). Some decisions had expressed conflicting rationales, see Wyatt v. Interstate
& Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1980) and DeArroyo v. Sindicato de
Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1980), while some courts of appeals had
recognized apportionment, see Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co., 580 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.,
523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); St. Clair v. Local 515, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969). 103 S. Ct.
at 593 n.8.
20. 103 S. Ct. at 593-94.
21. Id. at 594. The Union indicated that it would be liable for the employee's expenses
incurred in litigating his claim. Id. at 593.
22. Id. at 594.
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bargaining agreement implicates the federal common law of labor
policy.2 8
The Court noted that one of the issues decided in Vaca was
whether an employee could sue his employer for breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement where the union has the sole power to
process the grievance to arbitration and has chosen not to do so."
The Court observed that Vaca had recognized that the employer,
the union and the employee have important but different interests
in a properly functioning grievance procedure.2 5 Thus, in a situa-
tion where both the employer and the union have breached their
respective duties, the Court maintained, Vaca resolved the con-
flicting interests by holding that the employee's interest becomes
primary and the bar against suing the employer is lifted.2 6
Justice Powell stated that the interest analysis used in determin-
ing when an employee may sue his employer despite the presence
of a grievance procedure also provides a guiding principle for ap-
portioning damages between the employer and the union.27 He ex-
plained that the Vaca Court believed that the employer should be
responsible for the consequences of his wrongful act but recognized
that the union's breach increased the damages by preventing the
grievance procedure from rectifying the employer's breach.2 8 As to
apportionment of damages, Justice Powell stated that the union's
breach which triggers the employee's right to sue his employer also
implicates the union's responsibility for damages flowing from its
breach.2 9 He noted that it would be unfair to hold the employer
responsible for damages suffered by an employee as a result of a
union corrupting an arbitrator.30 Justice Powell concluded that
Vaca's governing principle, reflecting an allocation of responsibili-
23. Id.
24. Id. Justice Powell noted that Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)
held that the employer must attempt to utilize the grievance procedure due to "[C]ongress's
express approval of contract grievance procedures as a preferred method of settling dis-
putes, the union's interest in actively participating in the continuing administration of the
contract, and the employer's interest in limiting the choice of remedies available to the ag-
grieved employees." 103 S. Ct. at 594 n.10. See 379 U.S. 653. Justice Powell identified the
employee's interest as his "right to vindicate his claim." 103 S. Ct. at 594.
25. 103 S. Ct. at 594.
26. Id. at 594-95.
27. Id. at 595.
28. Id.
29. Id. To illustrate the union's responsibility for damages resulting from its breach,
Justice Powell referred to Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), which
held that a union's breach of its duty of fair representation would trigger the employee's
right to sue despite a final decision by an arbitrator. 103 S. Ct. at 595.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 595.
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ties, mandates that the employer be held liable for damages result-
ing from his breach and that the union be held liable for any in-
crease in those damages as a consequence of its failure to fairly
represent.
31
Justice Powell then examined the principle of apportionment in
the context of federal labor policy.3 2 He emphasized the impor-
tance of the grievance procedure in the federal labor policy since
the grievance procedure promotes settlement through negotiation
rather than strife and assists in defining the parties' relationship
under the agreement.3 3 Justice Powell described the union's role in
the grievance procedure as pivotal.3' He opined that since the
union is an employee's exclusive representative, the employer
should be able to rely on the union's determination not to proceed
with an employee's complaint as though the employee himself had
waived his claim. 5 Justice Powell indicated that the employer's re-
liance is justified by the fact that the union actively pursues exclu-
sive bargaining rights and therefore must accept the corresponding
duty to represent fairly." He expressed doubt that the grievance
procedure could perform its function in the federal labor policy if
the employer could not rely on the union's decision.
s
3
The Court then stated that Vaca's governing principle recog-
nizes the rights and duties of the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement.38 The Court reasoned that assessing damages according
to fault would provide incentive for performance of the parties' ob-
ligations, and that a rule placing liability solely upon the employer
could inhibit the placement of arbitration clauses in future agree-
ments.e The Court contrasted the finite nature of compensatory
31. Id. Justice Powell added that the employer would still be secondarily liable for
damages attributable to the union since "Vaca made clear that the union's breach does not
absolve the employer of liability." Id. at 595 n.12.
32. Id. at 597. Justice Powell noted that federal common law defines the relationship
created by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 596. See USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); USW v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33. 103 S. Ct. at 596.
34. Id. "[T]he union plays a pivotal role in the process since it assumes the responsi-
bility of determining whether to press an employee's claim." Id.
35. Id. at 597.
36. Id.
37. Id. Justice Powell noted that the dissenting members of the Court would not per-
mit an employer to rely on an union's withdrawal of a complaint, thereby making reinstate-
ment of an employee the only method of limiting its liability. Id. n.15. He stated that "[ilf
this were the rule, the very purpose of the grievance procedure would be defeated." Id.




damages with the unpredictability of punitive damages and noted
that the assessment of compensatory damages against the union is
not inconsistent with International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Foust,4° which held that an assessment of punitive
damages against a union is contrary to federal labor policy. 4' Addi-
tionally, the Court believed that the standard required to prove a
breach of the union's duty to fairly represent employees serves to
protect a union's discretion in processing complaints.42
Justice Powell then addressed the Union's contention that the
majority's interpretation of Vaca was inconsistent with Czosek v.
O'Mara,4 s in which employees of the Erie Lackawanna Railroad
were furloughed and not recalled. 44 He reviewed the facts in Czo-
sek and noted that the employees had brought suit against the
railroad for wrongful discharge and the union for breach of its duty
to fairly represent.45 The claim against the railroad was dismissed
by the district court since the employees had failed to seek their
administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act. 4" The dis-
trict court also dismissed the claim against the union, noting that
the union's duty was absolved because the employees could seek
the administrative remedies without the aid of the union.47 The
court of appeals affirmed as to the railroad, but held that the union
still had a duty to represent fairly the employees despite the exis-
tence of alternative remedies.
48
Justice Powell stated that in affirming the court of appeals, the
Czosek Court held that the union was liable only for the additional
expenses incurred by the employees in their attempt to collect
damages from the employer.49 Justice Powell distinguished Czosek,
40. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 597-98 & n.16. In emphasizing the fairness of the imposition of com-
pensatory liability on the Union, the Court indicated that the assessment "[w]ill provide an
additional incentive for the union to process its members' claims where warranted. This is
wholly consistent with a union's interest. It is a duty owed to its members as well as consis-
tent with the union's committment to the employer under the arbitration clause." Id. at 598
(citations omitted).
42. Id. at 597-98 n.16.
43. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 598.
45. Id.
46. Id. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). The Railway Labor Act permits an employee to
pursue a remedy from the National Railroad Adjustment Board if he is unsuccessful in the
grievance procedure. 103 S. Ct. at 598 n.18.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 598.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Czosek Court stated:
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any discriminatory
Vol. 22:977
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reasoning that in Czosek the union's breach of its duty did not
affect the employees' right to pursue immediately their administra-
tive remedies and thus did not increase the railroad's damages.50
Justice Powell concluded that Czosek's holding is consistent with
Vaca's principle which provides for assessment of damages accord-
ing to fault.51 Thus, the Court reversed the court of appeals and
ordered the case remanded for the apportionment of damages
against both the Service and the Union.
Justice White dissented from the majority's decision to hold the
Union liable for lost wages which had accrued after the hypotheti-
cal arbitration date.53 Justice White indicated that prior decisions,
equitable principles and national labor policy support his belief
that an employer is primarily liable for lost wages. 4
Justice White argued that where an employee institutes a suit
against his employer for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,"
and that agreement does not contain an arbitration clause, the em-
ployer is certainly liable for all back pay.6 In addition he cited the
rule adopted in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,57 noting that a
provision for arbitration in an agreement requires an employee to
exhaust his contractual remedies before bringing a section 301 suit
conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory refusal by the union to process
grievances based on the discharge, damages for the union are unrecoverable except to
the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances added to the difficulty and ex-
pense of collecting from the employer.
397 U.S. at 29.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 599.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist concurred
with Justice White's opinion on the issue of the Union's liability for back wages. Id.
54. Id. at 599-600 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated.that: "In addition to
the opinion below in the present case . . ." two courts of appeals have rendered "square
holdings on the issue." Id. at 599 n.1 (White, J., dissenting). See Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666
F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 649 F.2d 395 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1982).
55. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Justice White
noted that in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court held that an
employee could sue his employer under section 301 for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement. 103 S. Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White added that as an em-
ployee of the United States Postal Service, "Bowen's action technically arises under §
1208(b) of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1976), which is identical to §
301 in all relevant respects." 103 S. Ct. at 600 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
56. 103 S. Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting). See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
57. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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and thereby increases the difficulty in maintaining the suit for
backpay." Justice White observed that Vaca did permit an em-
ployee to sue his employer for breach of contract despite the pres-
ence of a grievance procedure where the union breached its duty of
fair representation and stood as the sole body which could process
the complaint through the procedure.8 ' He argued, however, that
Vaca's only effect on the employer was that the union's breach
could be raised by the employee to defeat an employer's conten-
tion that the employee failed to exhaust contractual remedies. 60
Justice White believed that the Court's subsequent decision in
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.6" emphasized the position
taken by the Court in Vaca that the union's breach of duty does
not insulate the employer from liability for his breach of the agree-
ment, but acts only to remove the bar to the bringing of a section
301 action. 62
With respect to the union's liability, Justice White indicated
that the union is liable for the natural consequences of its breach
but stated that the damages attributable to the union are of a dif-
ferent nature than those of the employer." He believed that the
Court had examined the nature of the union's liability in Czosek
and had limited the damages against the union to damages which
reflect the additional expense of collecting from the employer as a
result of the union's breach. 4
Justice White contended that in Electrical Workers v. Foust,"
the Court had accepted the fact that under the Vaca-Czosek rule,
the union's liability may be minimal." According to Justice White,
the Foust Court, in addition to having insulated the union from
punitive damages, had recognized that the major portion of dam-
58. 103 S. Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 24.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 601 (White, J., dissenting). In Hines, the Court held that an employee
could maintain a section 301 suit despite a final decision by an arbitrator where the arbitra-
tor was wrongfully influenced by the Union. 424 U.S. at 569. Justice White noted that be-
cause the employer had initiated the dispute by discharging the employee, the Hines Court
had rejected the employer's contention that it should be able to rely on the arbitrator's
decision. 103 S. Ct. at 601 (White, J., dissenting).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 602 (White, J., dissenting).
64. Id. According to Justice White, "Czosek reassured unions that they would not be
forced to pay damages 'for which the employer is wholly or partly responsible."' Id. (quot-
ing Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1970)).
65. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
66. 103 S. Ct. at 602 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 41 and accompanying text
Vol. 22:977984
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ages in an unfair representation action would be the employer's
responsibility.6s He opined that both Vaca and Foust had stressed
the importance of the union's financial stability at the expense of
the deterrent effect of a damage award. 8 Accordingly, Justice
White reasoned that the majority had abandoned the Vaca
principle.e9
Justice White then expressed his concern that the bulk of dam-
ages in a hybrid section 301-breach of duty of fair representation
suit would be imposed upon the union since the hypothetical arbi-
tration date would approximate one year after the improper dis-
charge, while a court decision would take much longer.7 0 He noted
that such a damage award would not reflect the union's culpability
compared to that of the employer and that the union could not
realistically limit its liability to the employee once it had breached
its duty to represent fairly, as only the employer could reinstate
the employee. 71 Justice White added that the damages caused ini-
tially by the employer's improper discharge increase as long as the
employer refuses to reinstate and that the union's conduct in no
way lessens the employer's culpability.72 He reasoned that tradi-
tional contract law is applicable in the situation, thereby making
the employer liable for all backpay. 8 Justice White emphasized
the fact that the union's conduct does not hamper an employer's
effort to reinstate."4 He concluded that the employer is solely liable
for back wages because the employer alone has the duty to pay
wages.
7 5
Justice White then attacked the majority's assumption that a
collective bargaining agreement creates in the employer a right to
rely upon a union to correct the employer's wrongful conduct
67. 103 S. Ct. at 602 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting).
71. Id. Justice White described the majority's view that a union may transfer a portion
of the backpay liability to the employer by giving the employer notice of the union's breach
as "disturbingly vague." Id. at 603 n.8. Furthermore, he questioned the union's willingness
to admit to a breach since it would be exposing itself to greater liability in the form of
attorney's fees and other collection costs. Id. at 605 n.12. (White, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting).
73. Id. Justice White said, "[t]here is no reason why the matter should not be gov-
erned by the traditional rule of contract law that a breaching defendant must pay damages
equivalent to the total harm suffered, 'even though there were contributing factors other
than his own conduct.'" Id. (quoting 5 A. COsIN, CORBIN ON CONmAcTs § 999 (1964)).
74. 103 S. Ct. at 603-04 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 604 (White, J., dissenting).
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through the grievance procedure.7" In Justice White's view, an
agreement does not obligate the union to pursue a grievance but
merely gives it the right to do so." Further, he submitted, the
union's duty of fair representation and pursuit of meritorious
claims is a duty owed to the employee, not the employer.7" Justice
White saw the majority's creation of an implied right in the em-
ployer as effectively requiring the union to indemnify the em-
ployer, a requirement for which he believed the employer should
have to bargain. In order to escape this newly imposed liability to
the employer, Justice White stated a union would be inclined to
appeal unworthy grievances to arbitration, a practice which would
adversely affect the ability of the grievance procedure to resolve
disputes.6 0
Justice White did recognize that a union would be jointly and
severally liable with the employer in a situation where the union
affirmatively induced the employer to breach the agreement.6 " Ad-
ditionally, he indicated that he would hold the union secondarily
liable where the union had breached its duty to fairly represent,
but had not caused the discharge, and where the employer was un-
able to pay the damages to which the employee was entitled.8 2 Jus-
tice White believed that the principle of primary and secondary
liability as it applied to a trust situation was also applicable to ap-
portioning damages in the instant case. 3 He cited with approval
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Justice White described the union's duty of fair representation as a "statutory
duty - implied by the judiciary." Id. at 604 & n.9. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ky.
Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
79. 103 S. Ct. 604-05 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White asserted: "[t]he Court's
holding therefore inserts a new substantive term into the agreement, which is precisely what
we have forbidden the lower courts from doing in our previous holdings." Id. at 605 n.11
(White, J., dissenting). See UMW Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562,
576 (1982).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 605 (White, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 605-06 (White, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 606 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White warned that common law princi-
ples are not always applicable to situations governed by federal labor law, but believed it
proper under the present circumstances. Id. In applying the trust principle in the context of
the instant case, Justice White noted:
[A] trust beneficiary may sue to enforce a contract entered into on his behalf by the
trustee if, but only if, the trustee "improperly refuses or neglects to bring an action
against the third person." If the beneficiary is able to collect in full from the primary
obligor, the trustee should not be monetarily liable. However, the trustee must pay if
his wrongful action causes a loss to the beneficiary, such as where the claim was origi-
nally enforceable, but the obligor has become insolvent, or where the claim has be-
Vol. 22:977
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the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Harrison v. Transportation Union," in which the court
held the union liable for lost wages where the union's breach of its
duty to the employee resulted in the employee's claim against his
employer becoming time-barred. 85 Justice White noted, however,
that he failed to see how such an exception was applicable in the
instant case, and concluded that he would affirm the court of ap-
peals' holding as to the Union's liability."
In part IV of his dissent, Justice White agreed with the major-
ity's view that the court of appeals erred by having refused to in-
crease the Service's damage assessment to reflect Bowen's total lost
wages after it had held that damages in the form of lost wages
could not be assessed against the Union. 7 Justice White indicated
that the court of appeals had based its decision on Bowen's failure
to file a cross-appeal against the Service for $30,000 which was the
amount the district court had assessed against the Union."0 He
noted that an important aspect of Vaca was its recognition of the
need for an effective remedy to make an employee whole, and that
the court of appeals had deprived Bowen of his effective remedy.89
Since the Union's wrongful conduct had no bearing on the initial
discharge, Justice White stated that the Union was not jointly and
severally liable and thus Bowen did not have cause to appeal.90 He
concluded that a contrary ruling would impose an additional bur-
den on the courts of appeals in the form of appeals from favorable
decisions.91
Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which
he expressed doubt regarding the Court's and Justice White's posi-
tion on the issue of Bowen's failure to cross-appeal.9 Since the ma-
jority had reversed the court of appeals, thereby holding the Union
liable for back wages, Justice Rehnquist believed that the language
in the opinions relating to Bowen's failure to appeal constituted
come barred by the statute of limitations.
Id. at 606 & n.14 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
84. 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 606 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. Justices Marshall and Blackmun concurred with Justice White's position on
this issue. See supra note 13.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 607 (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Justice White noted that "neither the facts of this case nor the concerns of
national labor policy required [the claimant] to appeal to protect his judgment." Id.
92. Id. at 607 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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dicta. 3 Furthermore, he noted that the cases cited by both the ma-
jority and Justice White revealed that the idea of holding a union
liable for back wages was a tenuous proposition, and suggested
that plaintiff's counsel should have filed a conditional cross-appeal
to increase the judgment against the Service should the Union's
liability have been denied on appeal.94 Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that the majority's and Justice White's disposition of the
appeal issue appeared to be contrary to United States v. American
Railway Express Co.95 and related authorities.96
The history of an employee's right to bring a suit alleging both a
breach of the union's duty to represent fairly and a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement by the employer involves the sepa-
rate evolution of the two components and their subsequent conver-
gence. 7 The roots of a union's duty of fair representation are
found in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad.98 In Steele, the
Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act9" to impose upon a union
the duty to exercise its representative power fairly and without
discrimination. 100 Twelve years later the Court found that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act 0'e subjected unions operating under the
Act to a duty of fair representation.
10 2
The history of an employee's right to enforce a collective bar-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 607-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he de-
cisions of the Courts of Appeals discussed both by Justice White's opinion and the Court's
opinion show at the very least that there was substantial doubt that a union could be held
liable for damages such as those awarded by the District Court." Id.
95. 265 U.S. 425 (1924).
96. 103 S. Ct. at 608 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In United States v. American Ry.
Express Co., the Court-stated that "[an] appellee may not attack the decree with a view
either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary,
whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree with respect to a
matter not dealt with below." 265 U.S. at 435.
97. For discussions of the evolution of the union's duty of fair representation, see
Aaron, The Duty of Fair Representation: An Overview in THE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTA-
TION 8 (J. McKelvey ed. 1977); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663 (1973).
98. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
99. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
100. 323 U.S. at 202-03.
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976).
102. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). rev'd & remanded
per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1956). The Court, citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
reversed the appellate court and permitted an injunction to issue against racial discrimina-
tion in the application of a collective bargaining agreement. 350 U.S. 892. See Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
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gaining agreement began with Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,10 3
in which the Court held that a union could sue an employer to
enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.10 4 Smith v. Eve-
ning News Association'0 extended the right to enforce a collective
bargaining agreement under section 301 to an individual employee.
In Smith, the employer had contended that an individual's con-
tract suit should be governed by state law; the Court, however,
cited the importance of uniformity in the meaning to be given to
contract terms and noted the possibility that such terms could be
given different meanings under state or federal law.106 Thus, under
Lincoln Mills and Smith, either the union or an individual em-
ployee could sue an employer to enforce the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, such suits being controlled by federal law.
The propriety of an individual employee's combining of section
301 action against an employer for breach of the bargaining agree-
ment with an action against the union for breach of its duty to
represent fairly was recognized implicitly by the Court in
Humphrey v. Moore.107 In Humphrey, an employee, Moore, had
sought an injunction against the union and the company to pre-
vent a joint employee-employer committee from implementing a
decision to dovetail two separate seniority lists, a decision which
would have resulted in Moore's lay-off.10s Moore had alleged that
103. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
104. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, an employer had refused a union's request
to submit several grievances to arbitration despite the fact that the collective bargaining
agreement contained an arbitration provision. Id. at 449. The Lincoln Mills Court upheld
the district court's order to the employer to comply with the agreement noting that section
301(a) authorizes "[fiederal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific perform-
ance of promises to arbitrate grievances under the collective bargaining agreements." Id. at
450-51.
105. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
106. Id. at 200-01. Furthermore, the employee in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n had
alleged a violation of the collective bargaining agreement which concededly was also an un-
fair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 197. The Court, however,
denied the employer's contention that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive
jurisdiction, holding that the courts' jurisdiction over a contract violation under section 301
was not destroyed by the Board's authority over an unfair labor practice. Id. at 197.
107. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
108. Id. at 336. The employees of two companies were represented by the same union
local. Part of the companies' business involved the transportation of new cars from a Ford
Motor Co. assembly plant, and Ford notified the two that there was room for only one of
them in the area. The companies negotiated an agreement whereby Dealers Transport Co., a
newer company with younger employees, would remain in the area while E & L Transport
Co., an older company with older employees, would concentrate its activities outside the
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the decision of the joint committee was influenced by dishonest
union conduct. 09 Although the Court found that the joint commit-
tee's decision was valid, the opinion noted that if the union had
breached its duty, then the employer's authority to implement the
layoffs based on the joint committee's decision would be under-
mined.' Thus the Court implied that an employer's conduct, in
accordance with a joint employer-union decision, could be in
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, if the union, in mak-
ing the joint decision, breached its duty of fair representation to
employees affected by the decision.
Vaca expressly recognized that a suit against the employer, to
enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement based on
section 301, could be combined with a suit against the union, for
breach of its duty to represent fairly, to form a single (hybrid) ac-
tion."' The Vaca Court noted that courts may be compelled to
decide if a union has breached its duty of fair representation to
determine if an employer has breached a collective bargaining
agreement, and that a combination of the actions facilitates the
employee's case."
12
During the period when the hybrid suit was developing, the
Court emphasized the importance of industrial self-government
and the grievance procedure in the framework of federal labor pol-
icy."8 Consistent with this emphasis, the Court in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox"4 held that an employee must attempt to utilize
the contract grievance procedure before instituting a hybrid suit
where the parties have agreed that arbitration is the exclusive rem-
edy.'" Two years after Republic Steel, the Vaca Court, recognizing
the union's discretion to supervise the grievance procedure and to
area. Id. at 336-37. The joint committee decided that the two separate seniority lists of the
companies should be sandwiched, or dovetailed, so that the employees with the most senior-
ity would work for the remaining company. The practical result of the decision would have
been the layoff of younger employees from Dealers to make room for older E & L employees.
Id. at 337.
109. Id. at 342.
110. Id. at 343.
111. 386 U.S. at 186-87.
112. Id. at 187.
113. See USW v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); USW v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); USW v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
114. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
115. Id. at 652. "Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a




appeal grievances to arbitration, stated that an individual em-
ployee does not have an absolute right to have his grievance heard
by an arbitrator." 6
Vaca further defined the relationship between the grievance pro-
cedure, an employee's right to bring a section 301 suit, and the
union's duty of fair representation.'1 7 Justice White, writing for the
Vaca majority, stated that before bringing a section 301 suit, the
employee must attempt to exhaust the exclusive grievance proce-
dure provided in the bargaining agreement.1 Justice White noted
that an employee would be relieved of the exhaustion requirement
where, contractually, the union had the sole power to appeal the
grievance to the higher steps of the procedure and wrongfully
failed to pursue the grievance.119 Thus, an employee who was dis-
charged unjustly may sue his employer for breach of the contract
without having to exhaust the grievance procedure if he can prove
that the union breached its duty of fair representation when it
failed to appeal his grievance.1"'
After Vaca, the apportionment of damages in a hybrid suit re-
mained an area of uncertainty."'1 Bowen, in holding that a union
may be held liable for lost wages, emphasized the fundamental na-
ture of the grievance procedure in federal labor policy."" This pol-
icy recognizes that a collective bargaining agreement attempts to
create a system of self-government, the heart of which is the griev-
ance procedure."s3 Solutions to varying problems are molded into a
private law through arbitration, which in turn gives content to the
116. 386 U.S. at 191. The Court noted that "through this settlement process, frivolous
grievances are ended prior to the most costly and time-consuming step in the grievance
procedure." Id.
117. See Aaron, supra note 97, at 14-15.
118. 386 U.S. at 184. Since the employee's claim is grounded in the breach of the
collective bargaining agreement, he must first attempt to utilize the remedial measures
which the agreement provides. Id.
119. Id. at 185. If the employer's conduct amounted to a repudiation of the contract,
however, he may be estopped to rely on the defense of the employee's failure to exhaust the
grievance procedure. Id.
120. Id. at 186. Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (estab-
lishing that the bar of finality accorded an arbitrator's decision by the courts could be lifted
if the union's breach of duty seriously undermined the arbitral process).
121. See generally Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DFR/Contract Suits:
Who Pays for the Union's Breach, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 155. Another area of uncertainty cen-
ters on the standard necessary to prove a union's breach of the duty of fair representation.
See generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agree-
ment: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. Rv. 251 (1977).
122. See 103 S. Ct. at 596.
123. USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1960).
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terms of the bargaining agreement.12 4 A labor arbitrator, in making
a decision, uses the common law of the industry in addition to the
terms of the agreement. 25
When a union breaches its duty of fair representation, the griev-
ance procedure malfunctions. 26 The rights of the employer, union
and employee, normally structured by a collective agreement, are
changed by a breakdown of the procedure. The right of the em-
ployee to be made whole becomes paramount. 2 7 The union's
breach opens the door to judicial intervention, 28 and the employer
may no longer insist on arbitration as the exclusive remedy. 2 9 Fur-
thermore, the employer's conduct may be reviewed by a judge or
jury without knowledge of the common law of the industry. 30 In
addition, Bowen subjects the union to substantial damages in the
form of back wages as an incentive to comply with the grievance
procedure. "'
Bowen did not absolutely relieve the employer of all liability for
lost wages accumulating after a hypothetical arbitration date, how-
ever. Since only the employer can rehire a discharged employee,
Justice Powell was compelled to address the question of how a
union could limit its liability for back wages once it had breached
its duty to an employee who had alleged that he was discharged
unjustly.'32 Justice Powell indicated that if the union had arguably
committed a breach, it could notify the employer and the notifica-
tion could be considered by the jury. 33 Presumably, notification
could shift at least a portion of lost-wage liability back to the em-
ployer. Thus, the ability of an employer to rely on the union's ini-
tial decision not to appeal a grievance, which Justice Powell
deemed critical to maintain an effective grievance procedure, " 4
124. Id. at 581.
125. Id. at 581-82.
126. 103 S. Ct. at 595.
127. Id. That an employee's right to be made whole is not of paramount importance
prior to the union's breach is established by the standard required to prove a union's breach
of its duty of fair representation. For example, in a discharge case, it is not sufficient for an
employee to establish a breach of the union's duty merely by convincing a jury that he was
in fact unjustly discharged. The employee must also prove "arbitrary or bad-faith conduct
on the part of the union in processing his grievance." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 193.
128. See Feller, supra note 97, at 706.
129. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 196.
130. See Feller, supra note 97, at 706.
131. 103 S. Ct. at 597.
132. Id. at 597 n.15.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 596-97.
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may be short-lived. Justice White, in his dissent, predicted that as
a consequence of Bowen, unions will appeal unworthy grievances to
arbitration to avoid potential liability,' a practice which could
prove to be expensive for both parties.136 Such action would also
serve to undermine the effectiveness of the grievance mechanism
which the Bowen majority sought to preserve.1
37
The Bowen opinions reflect the difficulty the Court faces in*at-
tempting to resolve the tangled interests while maintaining the
bargained-for expectations of the parties to a hybrid suit. 8'
Bowen's inherent uncertainty may prove to be the most valuable
aspect of the decision, however, and may result in a substantial
revision of grievance procedures. By subjecting unions to substan-
tial damages, Bowen has caused union officials to review their
grievance procedures.'39 Exposure to back pay liability should
serve as a powerful incentive for a union to negotiate a contractual
change in the grievance procedure to provide for review of a breach
of duty claim within the grievance mechanism itself. As to the em-
ployer's willingness to negotiate a review procedure, Bowen's refer-
ence to notification has left the employer's liability uncertain. 40
Increased union pressure, nebulous liability, the possibility of an
increasing number of unmeritorious grievances being appealed to
arbitration and an employer's interest in preserving arbitration as
the exclusive remedy for contract violations should temper an em-
ployer's resistance to an internal review procedure. 141
135. Id. at 605 (White, J., dissenting).
136. According to an AFL-CIO study, the union's half share cost of a single one day
arbitration proceeding averaged $2200 a case. LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 1977 (BNA) 206.
137. 103 S. Ct. at 596-98. Appeals of unworthy grievances to arbitration could defeat
the bargained for expectation of the employer, as it has been suggested that "an employer
bargains for union power to screen out frivolous grievances." Comment, Exhaustion of
Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 Tax. L : REV. 1179, 1204 (1973).
138. See Stone, The Post- War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509,
1541 (1981).
139. Executive Vice-President William H. Burrus of the American Postal Workers
Union estimated that Bowen could expose the Union to as much as $500,000 a year in liabil-
ity. Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 1983, at 130 E (industrial edition).
140. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
141. A private internal review of an employee's claim of a breach of the union's duty
to represent fairly must protect certain interests of the employee if a court is to require the
employee to exhaust the internal procedure. In Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981), the
Court cited three relevant factors that would influence a court's exercise of discretion in
ordering exhaustion of an internal union appeals procedure:
[F]irst, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope
to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals pro-
cedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to
award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third, whether exhaustion of inter-
1984
Duquesne Law Review
The establishment of an internal review procedure would permit
the parties to define their respective responsibilities through col-
lective bargaining while protecting the employee's statutory and
contractual rights. Imposition of reasonable time limits upon a
publicized procedure would encourage an employee to bring notice
of the union's breach before damages have accumulated to such an
extent as to discourage settlement. Likewise, more timely investi-
gation of an employee's claim would facilitate fact finding and ob-
jective decision-making and accordingly would allow for a more
rapid recovery by the employee.
What steps unions and employers will take to deal with Bowen's
apportionment of damages is uncertain. It is clear, however, that
Bowen's imposition of back pay liability upon unions and the deci-
sion's failure to clarify employer liability in a hybrid suit puts the
ball in the unions' and employers' court where it belongs.
George E. Kunst, Jr.
nal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a ju-
dicial hearing on the merits of his claim.
Id. at 689.
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